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This paper argues that in certain areas of policy, electoral systems can influence policy innovation (how
early countries will adopt certain policies). Electoral systems influence the number of parties that win
representation and thereby influence the diversity of perspectives included in the policymaking process.
It is argued here that this diversity facilitates elite and public consideration of new issues and ideas, and
consequently, it leads to earlier debate and action on these issues and ideas. This dynamic is particularly
relevant to controversial issues and ideas that major parties may be hesitant to address and that minor
parties may be more incentivized to promote. In this paper, two issues/ideas are considered: extending
rights to same-sex couples and making material sacrifices to protect the environment. I show that
countries with more proportional electoral systems tend to act earlier to protect the environment and
that they tend to be early adopters of civil union legislation. These results are also supported by World
Values Survey data showing public preference patterns that support these policy outcomes.
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Introduction
This paper argues that a particular feature of political information
environments—the diversity of perspectives magnified by the electoral
system—influences policy innovation or how quickly countries will adopt certain
policies. The argument hinges on the assumption that diversity is a form of openness
and, as such, that it affects a society’s flow of information. The flow of information will
be greater in societies with institutions that facilitate the expression of a more diverse
range of perspectives, and especially of dissenting perspectives. This variation in
information should be of great consequence to a wide range of political outcomes, but
especially to policy innovation and concomitant changes in public preferences.
The diversity framework is particularly relevant to research on the political
consequences of electoral institutions; indeed, few settings are as suitable to the
study of the effects of information diversity. By influencing the number of parties
that win representation, electoral institutions profoundly influence the breadth and
diversity of political discourse. They particularly influence whether minor parties
and their often marginalized concerns and ideas will be heard. This dynamic affects
how quickly countries will debate particular issues and ideas (especially issues that
can be considered sensitive or controversial at a particular point in time), and
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consequently how quickly countries will adopt certain legislation on those issues
and ideas.
This paper focuses on two issues that have in the last few decades become salient
across wealthier societies: the extension of rights to same-sex couples and making
material sacrifices to protect the environment. I argue that these issues are likely to
receive more attention in countries with institutions that facilitate the expression of
diverse perspectives (particularly, proportional representation [PR]). Consequently,
I show that this dynamic helps explain (i) why citizens in countries with more
proportional electoral systems tend to show more tolerance for homosexuality and
more support for protecting the environment and (ii) why these countries also
tend to have higher levels of policy innovation on these issues.
Electoral Institutions and the Information Environment
Decades of research shows that electoral institutions influence many areas of
politics. The core of this research establishes that electoral institutions influence the
character and nature of party systems (Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1994; Rae, 1971). But
they are also credited with influencing virtually every other important characteristic
of a democracy, including minority representation (Bowler, Donovan, & Brocking-
ton, 2003), the success of interest groups and social movements (Heidenheimer, 1973;
Kitschelt, 1986), responsiveness to public opinion (Powell, 2000), legitimacy
(Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 1999; Banducci & Karp, 1999), conflict mitigation
(Lijphart, 1969), and corruption (Chang & Golden, 2006). We are also learning that
electoral institutions influence a broad array of policy outcomes, including wealth
redistribution (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004) and several other elements of economic
policy (Persson & Tabellini, 2003).
This study focuses on how electoral institutions, by influencing the diversity of
perspectives given voice in the political system, affect policy innovation (or how
quickly countries adopt certain policies). To begin with, much research shows that
electoral institutions influence the diversity of perspectives included at various
stages of the representation process. In comparison with majoritarian systems (i.e.,
single-member-district systems), countries with institutions such as PR will have
more parties contesting elections (Katz, 1997) and more parties winning seats in the
legislature (Lijphart, 1999). Proportional systems also favor the inclusion of a greater
number of parties in the executive (Blais & Carty, 1987) and tend to grant the
opposition more influence in the legislature (Powell, 2000).
These dynamics are of consequence to the information environment because the
number of parties in a system affects the number of issue areas considered by the
political system (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 78–89). Moreover, because PR is associated with
more parties that are small, extreme, and ideological, it is also associated with
competition over a broader political spectrum. As demonstrated by Katz (1997, pp.
150–60), the party systems in PR systems represent a wider range of positions on a
left–right scale than do the party systems in countries with majoritarian systems.
They also represent a wider range of positions in most other policy areas, such as
taxation and environmental policy. We should expect, then, that more issue areas will
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tend to receive attention under multiparty proportional systems than under fewer-
party majoritarian systems. Under the proportional systems, we should also expect
to see a more diverse range of positions/ideas taken on any given issue.
Orellana (2009) shows that these dynamics are reflected in elite discourse and
media coverage. Most important for the purposes of this study, an increase in the
number of parties that win seats in a legislature was found to be associated with an
increase in the diversity of issues and ideas debated in the legislature and that
receive attention from the media. By winning even a few seats, minor parties gained
entry into elite debate and dramatically increased their share of media attention.
They also brought much greater attention to “new” issues and ideas.
Thus, past research strongly suggests that electoral systems affect the diversity of
perspectives magnified by the political system and that thereby they affect how
quickly certain issues will be debated and addressed. In particular, more propor-
tional electoral systems give minor parties greater opportunity to introduce many
issues/ideas that at a given point in time can be considered sensitive or controver-
sial. Many of these sensitive ideas will be neglected by the major parties either
because these parties find those ideas objectionable or because they find them too
risky to address even if they agree with them. The next section demonstrates that
these dynamics help explain patterns in another area critical to policy innovation:
public preferences.
Electoral Institutions and Changes in Public Preferences
The importance of the information dynamics, discussed above, for policy inno-
vation is underscored by research showing that electoral systems can influence
public opinion, a factor known to affect policymaking.1 Several studies have shown,
for example, that electoral systems influence various elements of public opinion and
behavior, including participation in elections, satisfaction with political institutions,
the tendency to cast tactical votes, attachments to parties (Karp, Vowles, Banducci, &
Donovan, 2002; Niemi, Whitten, & Franklin, 1992; Norris, 2004), and political sophis-
tication (Gordon & Segura, 1997). Here, it is argued that the information mechanisms
described in the previous section influence public attitudes in rather fine ways; they
can actually help explain why some societies come to hold certain preferences earlier
than others.
If electoral systems affect the diversity of party systems, and consequently, the
degree to which marginal ideas will be disseminated in a political system, then we
can expect that electoral systems will affect how soon and how frequently the public
will be exposed to certain messages. Namely, electoral systems should be expected to
affect access to information on what I refer to here as “sensitive” issues and “sensi-
tive” policy positions. My conceptualization of sensitivity involves two concerns.
First, sensitive issues and sensitive policy positions are those that more centrist
politicians and parties will find difficult to discuss. Consequently, many of these
kinds of issues and positions are more likely to be introduced by minor parties,
which tend to have more space to dissent. Second, sensitivity is a time-dependent
concept. An issue that is sensitive at a particular point in time is one that could be
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ordinary in another. For example, an issue like racial equality was once a sensitive
issue in most countries, and today it is largely taken for granted that discrimination
based on race should be illegal.
To identify more current examples of sensitive issues, we can turn to recent
literature on modernization and the rise of “postmaterialistic” preferences. Modern-
ization theorists have argued that socioeconomic development is associated with
technological innovations, increases in labor productivity, occupational specializa-
tion, rising levels of education, rising levels of income, and the diversification of
human interactions, and that these factors in turn produce coherent changes in
culture and politics.2 In general, these forces encourage the development of more
“cosmopolitan,” “secular,” “tolerant,” and “self-expressive” social attitudes. With
respect to particular attitudes and behaviors, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) note that in
recent decades, wealthy societies have experienced cultural changes that include the
supplanting of institutionalized religion with individualized spiritual concerns,
greater support for protecting the environment, and greater tolerance toward issues
such as homosexuality, gender equality, and divorce.
Thus, the postmaterialism literature points to several issues that are currently
transitioning from controversial to ordinary, particularly across wealthier countries.
This paper concentrates on two of these issues: the rights of same-sex couples and
protection of the environment.3 These two issues are relatively difficult for centrist
policymakers in two-party systems to address because they are imbued with con-
troversy and political costs, especially when they are first introduced. An issue such
as extending rights to same-sex couples involves advancing the interests of a his-
torically unpopular minority group, while protecting the environment requires
asking the public to make material sacrifices.
To some extent, protecting the environment is not a conventional sensitive issue;
it is in some ways a valence issue, meaning that it is an issue that few people disagree
with. Even so, levels of commitment do tend to decline as people begin to realize that
there are costs involved (Inglehart, 1995). A case in point is the issue of gasoline taxes
in the United States. While a strong majority of Americans support protecting the
environment, it is unimaginable that a presidential candidate in the United States
would ever run on the position that taxes on gasoline should be higher—even
though Americans pay lower taxes on gasoline than the citizens of most other
countries. Indeed, both parties tend to attack each other when gasoline prices rise.
Without a minor party to promote a dissenting position, the elite consensus rein-
forces the position that gasoline taxes should be low, and consequently, we should
expect the American public to more readily oppose increases in gasoline taxes.
Evidence from New Zealand, which shifted from a majoritarian to a propor-
tional electoral system, confirms that these “postmaterialistic” issues are more likely
to receive attention under proportional systems. Orellana (2009) and Hayward and
Rudd (2000) found that once the New Zealand Green Party was able to win seats
under the PR system, it successfully brought attention to the issues it promoted.
News coverage of the environment dramatically increased, as did coverage of chang-
ing sexual norms. More importantly, the adoption of PR brought greater attention to
several specific proposals on the environment that can be considered politically
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risky, including proposals on eco-taxes and the use of industrial hemp. A similar
dynamic emerged for the issue area of sexual norms. In 1999, thanks in large part to
the minor parties, there was for the first time coverage of positions supporting the
rights of gay/lesbian/transgender individuals.
It should be emphasized at this point that this evolution of preferences is not
precluded by majoritarian systems. All democratic systems permit the flow of sig-
nificant amounts of information, and we should therefore observe this evolution of
preferences in all advanced democracies—and indeed, Inglehart’s work suggests
that this is happening. The key point is that the evolution is more rapid under
electoral institutions that facilitate the expression of diverse ideological perspectives.
Institutions such as PR should facilitate the discussion of sensitive issues and sensi-
tive policy positions enough to affect public consideration of such issues and posi-
tions, and enough that electoral institutions can help explain the variation in
attitudes toward sensitive issues that exists across democratic countries.
Measurement
To explore empirically how electoral systems affect public preferences on the
environment and homosexuality, data from the 1999 World Values Survey were used
(European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 2004). The
questions used were the following:
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Homosexu-
ality. 1 Never justifiable—10 Always justifiable.
Can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly
disagree? The Government should reduce environmental pollution, but it
should not cost me any money.
The question on homosexuality is relatively straightforward and directly tracks
tolerance of homosexuality. The question on the environment is a little more subtle.
As discussed by Inglehart (1995), direct questions on the environment tend to
capture the valence nature (the popularity) of protecting the environment. In most
developed countries, direct questions on environmental protection reveal strong
majorities in favor of protecting the environment. However, this result changes when
respondents are asked the question presented above, which uses wording that
makes it easier for respondents to say no to making sacrifices to protect the environ-
ment. Inglehart thus found that this wording captures more of the hidden unwill-
ingness to make sacrifices.
The proportion of respondents showing support in each country for each ques-
tion4 was regressed on the key independent variable for this analysis: the effective
threshold. Unlike categorical measures that distinguish between majoritarian, mixed-
member, and proportional systems, Lijphart’s (1994) effective threshold measure
provides a continuous measure of the type of electoral system employed by a
country.5 The effective threshold is a more refined indicator of the barriers parties
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must overcome to win seats, taking into account the average district magnitude6 (the
number of seats up for grabs in a district) and any national legal threshold present in
a country. As such, it is also a good indicator of the obstacles parties face in winning
legislative seats and the incentives parties will face when they compete for support,
capturing the degree to which parties may need to moderate their policy agendas
and messages in order to receive enough votes to win legislative seats.
Fewer parties will be able to win seats, and more message moderation will be
required in more majoritarian systems (such as in the United States), which are
coded as requiring 37.5 percent of the vote in order for a party to win a seat in a
single-member district. More parties will be able to win seats in systems such as the
Netherlands, where the effective threshold is 1 percent, and especially small parties
will be rather free to explore a wider range of policy issues and positions. Data from
the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, &
Walsh, 2001) and Inter-Parliamentary Union are used to calculate the average effec-
tive threshold for the lower chamber in each country over 10 years, from 1988 to
1997.7 Taking the average over the last 10 years should capture the effects of any
relevant reforms undertaken by countries. To reflect the expectation that there is
likely a “diminishing rate of return” from moving from a pure proportional system
to a more and more majoritarian system, this variable was logged.
A second key variable is demographic heterogeneity. This variable can be consid-
ered another source of information diversity, but its expected effects are unclear.
Ethnic diversity can conceivably increase the diversity of political discourse, but it
can also introduce tensions that may negatively affect the flow of information. To
capture the effect of this factor, data are taken from Yeoh Kok Kheng’s (2001)
measure of ethnic fractionalization, which accounts for religious, racial, and linguis-
tic cleavages.
Controls are also introduced for the number of years a country is considered
democratic, the level of economic development, and predominant religious affilia-
tions. The information effects of electoral institutions should be rather minimal and
even nonexistent in countries that are nondemocratic and particularly in systems that
limit free speech and the media. For this reason, the number of years that a country
is regarded as free (by Freedom House) is controlled for (years free). This variable was
also used to select the countries included in the sample. Only countries that were free
for 10 years or more, through 1999, are included in the analysis. For most models, the
values are taken for the period from 1972 to 1999; for the civil union legislation model
(analyzed in the next section), the values are taken for the period from 1972 to the
year when the country adopted the civil union legislation.
Economic development is controlled for because modernization studies suggest
that citizens with greater material wealth begin thinking less about “lower-order”
issues such as economic security and more about “higher-order” issues such as
quality of life and concern for the environment (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Moreover,
controlling for economic development should also help control for the effects of
various information technologies that become more prevalent as a country becomes
wealthier. Here, economic development is measured with data from the Penn World
Tables and the CIA World Factbook on GDP per capita.8 With respect to religious
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affiliation, Roman Catholic societies have historically tended to resist secularization
even in the face of communist rule and socioeconomic development (Inglehart &
Welzel, 2005, p. 75). This should produce direct consequences for issues such as
homosexuality. The proportion of Protestants was also controlled for, while all other
religious groups were excluded because they appear in negligible numbers in the
countries examined.
Results
Table 1 displays the regression results for public preferences. We can see, first,
that the effective threshold significantly predicts attitudes toward both the environ-
ment and homosexuality. As the effective threshold increases, as we move toward
majoritarianism, we find less support for each of these issues. Substantively, a change
in the effective threshold from its lowest value to its highest value (which is equiva-
lent to switching from a nearly pure proportional system like the Netherlands’ to a
majoritarian system like the United States’) is associated with a nearly 9 percent drop
in support for protecting the environment and an 8 percent drop in support for
homosexuality.
These results provide strong evidence that electoral systems can influence how
quickly public preferences change on certain sensitive issues. We know from Ingle-
hart and from regular polling data that tolerance of homosexuality and support
for the environment are on the rise in all the countries analyzed here. But the fact
that proportional systems are in the lead on these changes confirms that
information—particularly, an elite discourse that is ideologically diverse—plays a
critical role.
With respect to the other explanatory variables, it is interesting to note that ethnic
fractionalization predicts positive support for homosexuality (although only at the
0.1 level) but has no statistically significant influence on support for environmental
protection. This finding suggests that ethnic fractionalization does help introduce the
Table 1. Electoral Systems and Public Preferences
Environment Homosexuality
Effective threshold (logged) -0.087** (0.033) -0.080*** (0.023)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.077 (0.128) 0.173* (0.089)
Years free (through 1999) 0.001 (0.007) 0.005 (0.005)
GDP per capita (in 1999) 0.002 (0.006) 0.010** (0.004)
Catholic -0.226 (0.097) -0.092 (0.067)
Protestant 0.098 (0.117) 0.125 (0.080)
Constant 0.556*** (0.161) 0.245** (0.116)
R2 0.579 0.723
N (countries) 26 35
*p  0.1, **p  0.05, ***p  0.01 (2-sided).
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source of survey data: World Values Survey (1999).
Sources of effective threshold data: World Bank and Inter-
Parliamentary Union.
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public to new social issues such as the concerns of same-sex couples; however, it
does not encourage debate on new nonsocial issues such as the environment.
As for the control variables, most of them produced no significant effects. The
only significant effect came from economic development on support for homosexu-
ality. This result is consonant with Inglehart’s thesis that economic development is
linked with increases in postmaterialism. It should be noted that the results for the
democracy and economic development variables should be interpreted with caution,
mainly because countries were in part selected on these variables. Most countries in
the sample were relatively wealthy and democratic, and consequently, their effects in
this analysis are likely understated.
Electoral Institutions and Policy Innovation
The theoretical discussion and the results of the previous section suggest that
there are policy areas in which countries with more proportional electoral systems
are likely to innovate. That is, there are policies that countries with PR are more likely
to adopt first and that other countries will eventually adopt. In this section, attention
is given to policy innovation on the rights to same-sex couples and protection of the
environment. Other “postmaterialistic” issues were considered—including euthana-
sia, embryonic cell research, and decriminalization of prostitution—but unfortu-
nately, there is not yet enough variation across a sufficiently large sample of countries
on these issues. At the time of this writing, too few countries have adopted relevant
legislation on these issues, although it should be noted that the only two countries to
formally legalize euthanasia (the Netherlands and Belgium) are countries with PR.
For issues such as abortion and divorce, data from earlier time periods are required,
and this is particularly problematic for data on public preferences and electoral
systems.
Measurement
Policy innovation on same-sex issues is operationalized as the amount of time it
takes a country to adopt civil union legislation. In recent decades, countries have
begun to extend rights to same-sex couples mainly by passing civil union legislation
and in some cases by legalizing same-sex marriage. The period under consideration
begins in 1988 (the year before Denmark became the first country to adopt civil
union legislation) and ends in 2006. For this analysis, each country was given a score
based on the number of years it took to adopt the legislation.
An event history model is used to analyze the adoption of civil union legislation
because the sample of countries can be considered censored. Through 2006, only 21
countries had adopted civil union legislation, and this figure is likely to rise with the
passage of time. Event history models permit the modeling of the probability that an
event will happen, given that, through the period observed, the event has not
happened (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). A Weibull hazard model is used to
analyze a total of 57 countries (that were democratic for at least 10 years through
2004) because it is capable of handling the expectation that the hazard rate changes
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as time passes. In this case, it is expected that once the first nations have adopted civil
union legislation, it should become easier for other nations to do so.
Policy innovation on environmental protection is measured here in three ways.
Since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, many countries have
sought to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Particularly since the Kyoto Protocol,
many countries have sought to reduce their CO2 emissions to below their levels in
1990. If it is easier for countries with more proportional electoral systems to enact
measures that protect the environment but at the same impose material costs, then
we might expect to see that electoral systems affect the progress countries have made
on reducing CO2 emissions. To explore this possibility, data on CO2 emissions per
capita were collected from the International Energy Agency (2009). The dependent
variable in this case is the percentage change in CO2 emissions per capita in OECD
countries from 1990 to 2007.
For a more nuanced look at the relationship between electoral systems and
environmental action, we can also explore the relationship between electoral systems
and the price of gasoline. It should be more difficult for majoritarian governments to
discuss increasing taxes on gasoline, and this should decrease public support for this
action. Proportional systems should permit minor parties to offer dissenting posi-
tions that might argue for increases in “eco-taxes.” These dynamics should affect the
rate of taxation on gasoline and should ultimately affect gas prices. Data on gasoline
prices were collected from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenar-
beit (Ebert, Metschies, Schmid, & Wagner, 2009). The dependent variable in this case
is then the retail price of gasoline in OECD countries as of November 2008 (in U.S.
cents/liter).
Finally, a more general measure of environmental performance was analyzed:
the Pilot Environmental Performance Index (EPI). This index was developed by the
Global Leaders of Tomorrow World Economic Forum in collaboration with the
Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for International
Earth Science Information Network of Columbia University.9 It was designed to
measure environmental results at a national level by gauging performance on and
rates of change in air quality, water quality, greenhouse gas emissions, and land
protection. The index was collected in 2002 and is available for 21 democratic
countries.
Ordinary least squares was used to analyze all three continuous dependent
indicators of environmental policy innovation. The independent variables in this
section are the same as those used in the previous section, including the effective
threshold (averaged through 2004), ethnic fractionalization, the number of years a
country was considered democratic, GDP per capita (for 2004), and the proportion of
citizens who are Catholic or Protestant. The one difference is that the model for CO2
emissions controls for the starting level of CO2 in 1990 instead of GDP per capita. The
starting level of CO2 should still control for the level of economic development, but
more importantly, it should control for the effects of starting at different levels of CO2
emissions. If there is a diminishing rate of returns, then countries starting at higher
levels of emissions should have an advantage. On the other hand, some of the
countries starting at lower levels of emissions were at lower levels of development
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and thus increased their emissions as they caught up to the levels of development of
the other OECD countries. Thus, because of rapid development, Spain increased its
emissions considerably over the period analyzed, while Britain considerably
decreased its emissions, even though Spain ultimately finished 2007 with lower
emissions per capita than Britain.
Results
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 2. We are first able to observe
that the effective threshold has a negative and significant effect (at the 0.01 level) on
the adoption of civil union legislation. The more majoritarian a country, the less
likely it is to adopt this kind of legislation. In particular, a change from a pure
proportional system to a pure majoritarian system is associated with a 65 percent
decrease in the “hazard” or “risk” that a nation will adopt civil union legislation.10
No other explanatory variable significantly predicts the adoption of civil union
legislation, including the level of economic wealth, even though this model does
include more developing countries. A final point about this model is that the dura-
tion parameter (p) for this model is significantly above 1.0, at 2.8, indicating that the
“risk” that a nation will adopt civil union legislation does indeed increase with time.
Once the first country adopts civil union legislation, it becomes easier for other
countries to do so.
In the case of environmental performance, the results suggest that the effective
threshold has a significant effect (at the 0.05 level) on all three indicators in the
expected direction. Substantively, a move from a system of pure PR to a pure
majoritarian system (equivalent to moving from the Netherlands to the United
States) shifts the percentage change in CO2 emissions by 11 percent in the positive
direction, toward increasing emissions. The same move also decreases gas prices by
13 percent, which means gas taxes tend to be lower in majoritarian countries, and it
decreases the score on the environmental performance index by approximately 4.5
percent.
Taken together, these results suggest not just that electoral systems affect envi-
ronmental performance, but that they do so in particular ways. By allowing dissent-
ers to discuss costs, more proportional systems are able to impose those costs largely
with the acceptance of the public. This dynamic is particularly reflected in the prices
for gasoline. But the innovative nature of the policy outcomes is also reflected in the
ability of proportional countries to respond earlier to dilemmas—such as global
warming and environmental degradation—which all countries are seeking to
address.
No other variables significantly affected all three environmental performance
indicators. In fact, the only other significant effects observed were the positive effects
of Catholic (0.1 level) and Protestant (0.01 level) background on the EPI. Again,
however, the effects of variables such as economic development and democratic
freedom are likely reduced by the use of samples that overrepresent wealthy, demo-
cratic countries.
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Conclusion
This paper has argued that electoral institutions influence the political informa-
tion environment and consequently that they influence policy innovation. Through
their influence on the party system, electoral institutions influence how quickly
certain policy issues and ideas can be debated, how quickly public opinion will shift
on these ideas, and thus how quickly governments can respond to these issues and
ideas. In particular, these mechanisms help explain why countries with PR have
tended to take earlier action on protecting the environment (i.e., by reducing CO2
emissions) and extending rights to same-sex couples.
It should be noted that while PR produces policy innovation on these
issues—that to a great extent lie along the postmaterialism dimension identified by
Inglehart (1997)—it may be possible that majoritarian institutional arrangements
produce innovation in other policy areas. For example, one of the main advantages
claimed by majoritarian systems, such as the UK, is that they concentrate power in
the hands of one party and thus produce governments strong and stable enough to
impose even unpopular policies (Lijphart, 1999). Conceivably, this advantage could
allow majoritarian systems to innovate in certain policy areas. This possibility is best
left to future work.
On a related note, historical evidence suggests that majoritarian systems were
once innovators on issues such as the extension of voting rights to women. This is an
issue that became salient for many democracies at the end of the nineteenth century.
In Table 3, it is possible to observe that the countries that became today’s multiparty
democracies (and that therefore tend to act earlier on modern sensitive issues) have
not always been at the forefront of policy innovation. On the contrary, the first two
countries to grant women the right to vote (New Zealand and Australia) employed
more majoritarian electoral systems, and several other majoritarian countries
(Canada, Ireland, the UK, and the United States) were not far behind.
This indicates that at some point, countries with majoritarian systems held the
“openness” (information flow) advantage, likely because they tended to have been
democratic for a longer period of time, and thus they enjoyed a more open political
discourse. Circa 1900, three of the four most democratic countries (with a polity
score of 10) were majoritarian countries, while most of the countries that became
today’s proportional democracies tended to have autocratic characteristics (indicated
by the negative polity scores). This suggests that the development of openness can
proceed in a dialectical manner. At one point, the development of free and fair
elections provided countries with a significant openness advantage. More recently,
the openness advantage appears to have shifted to countries that have not only
developed free and fair elections but that have also developed institutions that
facilitate the expression of diverse perspectives.
There are many important practical implications for these findings beginning
with the possibility that these findings could be used to make predictions. We can
ask, for example, whether these findings help us predict the direction of policymak-
ing in majoritarian countries like the United States. Can these dynamics also help us
predict changes in the developing parts of the world? How will PR affect policy-
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making in Latin America? Indeed, several Latin American countries are beginning to
extend rights to same-sex couples, while Chile, one of the more majoritarian coun-
tries in the region, appears to be moving most slowly on this issue (and other issues
related to sexuality, such as abortion and contraception). Perhaps most importantly,
these findings may lead us to ask whether the innovation differences discussed here
provide countries with tangible advantages. Are the differences in timing relevant to
national competitiveness? If so, then significant attention needs to be allocated to
ways in which diversity can be increased in the political arena.
Salomon Orellana is a lecturer at the University of Michigan, Dearborn. His research
focuses on electoral institutions, information diversity, public opinion, and policy-
making.
Notes
1. The influence of public opinion on policymaking is the subject of several famous studies, including
Monroe (1983), Page and Shapiro (1983), Miller and Stokes (1963), Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993),
and Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995).
Table 3. Women’s Suffrage
Countries Year Rights Extended Polity Score Circa 1900
New Zealand 1893 10
Australiaa 1902 10
Finland 1906 8 (1917)
Norwaya 1913 10
Denmark, Iceland 1915 -3
Canada 1918 9
Irelanda 1918 8 (1921)




Estonia 1918 8 (1917)
Kyrgyzstan 1918 NA
Latvia 1918 7 (1920)
Poland 1918 8 (1918)







United States 1920 10
Albania 1920 -2
Czech Republic 1920 7 (1918)
Slovakia 1920 7 (1918)
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997).
Polity scores are for the year 1900 or the earliest year for which data are available for a country. The dates
for the latter scores are noted in parentheses.
aThe right was subject to conditions or restrictions.
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2. See Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Rokeach (1960), Inkeles (1983), Inkeles and Smith (1974), and Lerner
(1958).
3. Other issues were considered, but as noted in the next section, there was not as much policy outcome
data available for those issues.
4. The proportion of respondents showing support for each issue was calculated by creating a binary
variable that divided the responses to the World Values Survey questions into positive and negative
responses. On the question pertaining to homosexuality, a value of 1 was assigned to responses of 6 or
above. For the question on the environment, a value of 1 was assigned to disagree and strongly
disagree. The score for each country, then, is the proportion of citizens that revealed a positive
response to homosexuality and protecting the environment.






where M = the average district magnitude. If a national legal threshold
represents a higher barrier to party entry, then that value is used instead.
6. According to Cox (1990), district magnitude is the factor that has the largest influence on spatial
incentives.
7. For this study, one adjustment is made to this measure. Rather than coding runoff systems
as requiring 37.5 percent of the vote (as done by Lijphart), they are coded here as requiring
20 percent of the vote. This is done because runoff systems tend to increase the number of candidates
competing for office (see Shugart and Carey, 1992) and should therefore encourage multipartism and
a broader political discourse (especially during campaigns) at least more so than pure majoritarian
systems that rely solely on majoritarian rules. Runoff systems can also affect public expectations
regarding elite behavior. Westholm and Niemi (1992) argue that “systems with proportional repre-
sentation . . . or runoff elections . . . will force voters to think in terms of coalitions and second
choices” (p. 31).
8. The source used depends on which allowed the inclusion of the highest number of countries. In one
of the models, the CIA World Factbook provided GDP per capita data on a few extra countries.
9. The Pilot Environmental Performance Index is from 2002 and can be found at http://www.
ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI
10. The percentage change in the hazard associated with a unit change in a covariate is: *(Hazard
Ratio - 1).
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